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Restricting minimum wage protection on social care ‘sleep in’ shifts 
Consider this: an employer binds a worker to attend their place of work, on time and for a 
specific duration, yet permits them to sleep throughout the shift unless their services are 
required. Does the employer have a statutory duty to pay at least as much as the national 
minimum wage for all the hours of the shift? At issue in Royal Mencap Society v Tomlinson-
Blake and Shannon v Rampersad [2018] EWCA Civ 1641; [2018] 7 WLUK 321 was the 
scope of minimum wage protection where workers were permitted to sleep during overnight 
shifts in which they had the care of vulnerable adults. At stake was an estimated £400 million 
liability that social care employers feared they may carry for an underpayment of wages to 
workers on so-called “sleep-ins”.  
The National Minimum Wage Act 1998 (NMWA) at s.1 provides workers with a right to be 
paid at least as much as the relevant national minimum wage rate within a pay reference 
period. Section 2 NMWA gives the Secretary of State powers to make regulations about the 
circumstances and time for which a worker is to be treated as working or not. However, 
s.2(8) limits those powers such that no regulations shall be made which treat the same 
circumstances differently by reason of different sectors of employment or occupations. 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment in Mencap was delivered by Lord Justice Underhill. A 
“sleep-in” was defined by the Court as a worker’s contractual obligation “to spend the night 
at or near the workplace […] on the basis they are expected to sleep for all or most of the 
period but may be woken if required to undertake some specific activity” (at [6]). Underhill 
L.J. began by identifying that it was commonplace in the care sector for agreements to be 
made in which workers “sleep-in” overnight at premises where vulnerable people reside. 
Typically, in return for a fixed payment, care workers on “sleep-ins” could be called on if 
assistance was required, but they otherwise had no duties. The judgment sought to establish 
the correct approach to sleep-in cases generally, before turning to the particulars of the 
appeals relating to care workers Claire Tomlinson-Blake and John Shannon. 
The EAT had previously applied a multi-factorial test to determine if a worker was 
“working” on such a “sleep-in” shift (reported as Focus Care Agency v Roberts [2017] ICR 
1186). That test, if answered in the affirmative, established minimum wage obligations for 
the shift in full. The Court of Appeal in Mencap overturned the approach. It replaced the need 
to ask whether a worker is “working”, with a bright-line test as to whether a worker is 
“expected to sleep” for all or most of their shift. Consequently, workers who are “expected to 
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sleep” are deemed to fall under parts of the national minimum wage regulations known as the 
availability regulations. To the collective relief of social care employers, entitlement to pay 
protection was therefore limited to periods in which workers are “awake for the purposes of 
working” and “required to be available”.  
Since the introduction of the UK’s statutory minimum wage scheme there have been three 
versions of the availability regulations. Each version uses similar wording to define 
“availability” and ensure that workers are subject to minimum wage protection during 
“available” time. The core requirements are that an “available” worker is “at or near” a place 
of work, which is not the workers’ home, except if the worker “by arrangement sleeps”, in 
which case they are considered to be available only while they are “awake for the purposes of 
working”. Finding the correct interpretation of these regulations in respect of “sleep-ins” was 
at the heart of deliberations in Mencap.  
Underhill L.J. noted that as a matter of statutory duty at s.5(1) NWMA, the Secretary of State 
was required to consult with the Low Pay Commission before drafting the first minimum 
wage regulations. Section 5(2) NMWA required the Low Pay Commission to publish 
recommendations and in its 1998 report, recommendation 12 related to situations in which 
workers were paid to sleep: 
“For hours when workers are paid to sleep on the work premises, 
workers and employers should agree their allowances as they do now. 
But workers should be entitled to National Minimum Wage for all 
times when they are awake and required to be available for work 
(para 4.34)”. Para 4.34 explained, “Certain workers, such as those 
who are required to be on call and sleep on their employer’s premises 
(eg in residential homes or youth hostels) need special treatment”.  
Section 5(4) NMWA required that in the event of the Secretary of State deciding not to 
follow the recommendations of the Low Pay Commission, he or she must lay an explanatory 
report before Parliament. Since there was no report laid before Parliament, the Court of 
Appeal concluded that these recommendations and their corresponding explanatory text were 
of “fundamental importance” to finding the correct interpretative approach in Mencap (at 
[13]).  
Underhill L.J. stated that, “the Commission deals expressly with the case of workers who 
sleep-in in ‘residential homes’ […] which are essentially the kinds of case with which we are 
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concerned” (at [13]). He stressed it was, “of course obvious” that the availability regulations 
should apply in such cases (at [43]). The test required therefore, was one establishing if 
workers were “expected to sleep” and was made out where they are typically not woken from 
sleep or spend only a minority of their shift awake for the purpose of undertaking specific 
tasks. In these situations, the availability regulations apply directly (regulation 31 or 
regulation 32, National Minimum Wage Regulations 2015).  
Yet, in a prior suite of cases, the EAT and Court of Appeal had found that shifts in which 
workers were permitted to sleep did not fall within the scope of “availability” because the 
workers were deemed to be “working” throughout. In British Nursing Association v Inland 
Revenue [2002] EWCA Civ 494; [2002] 3 WLUK 773, telephone call handlers working 
overnight from their own homes were permitted to sleep during periods in which there were 
no telephone calls to be answered. In determining their minimum wage entitlements, the 
Court of Appeal asserted that availability regulations provided entitlements “in addition” to 
protection available during time when workers were “working” (at [15]). Therefore, the 
availability regulations were to have no relevance if it could first be established that workers 
were “working”. To determine the question of “work” in British Nursing, the reasoning of the 
Court hypothetically transposed the workers’ activities into an office environment, where it 
became plainly evident that waiting between telephone calls constituted “work”. 
Consequently, availability regulations did not apply and employer obligations to pay at least 
as much as the relevant minimum wage rate adhered to all hours of the overnight shift, even 
if workers were sleeping. 
Following British Nursing, Underhill L.J. in Mencap recognised that the direct application of 
the availability regulations to sleep-in situations was not logically the “first step” and it was 
“strictly necessary to ask first” whether a worker was “working” because the availability 
regulations apply only in the negative (at [43]). However, the reasoning of Underhill L.J. then 
took a curious, although determinative, turn. He insisted that the question of whether or not a 
worker is “working” is: 
“for practical purposes an unnecessarily elaborate approach. The self-
evident intention of the relevant provisions is to deal comprehensively 
with the position of sleep-in workers” (at [43]).  
Although Underhill L.J. confirmed the decision in British Nursing, he stated that its reasoning 
and substance was not decisive in situations where “the essence of the arrangement is that the 
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worker is expected to sleep” (at [57]). He then addressed Scottbridge Construction v Wright 
[2003] S.C.520; [2002] 10 WLUK 721, an authoritative case in which a security guard who 
had been expected to sleep was found to be “working”. Mr Wright had few duties to perform 
and was permitted to sleep for 10 hours of his 14-hour shift, yet the availability regulations 
were found surplus to requirements because he was “working” throughout the shift. His lack 
of activity had no bearing on the question of “work” since his duty was “to attend the 
premises” (at [2]) and be “in attendance” (at [11]). Minimum wage liabilities therefore arose 
throughout the whole of his overnight shift. Underhill L.J. recognised that “the core facts [in 
Scottbridge] were indistinguishable from those of the kinds of case with which we are 
concerned” yet also asserted that Scottbridge could not determine issues arising in the care 
sector (at [79]). This, he said, was because the availability regulations, read together with the 
recommendations of the Low Pay Commission, “require the case of a sleeper in in a 
residential home to be treated as a case of availability for work and not one of actual work” 
(at [79]). 
The authority of British Nursing and Scottbridge had produced mixed results where 
previously considered by the EAT. Anderson v Jarvis Hotels EATS/0062/05/RN; [2006] 5 
WLUK 771 was one of the earliest cases. Notably, this was not a minimum wage claim 
because it considered whether the terms of a worker’s contract entitled him to contractual pay 
during sleep-over nightshifts. In asking whether Anderson was “working”, the EAT said that 
it was wrong to look for evidence of specific activity. Jarvis Hotels needed two employees on 
site at all times for health and safety and fire regulation purposes and although Anderson’s 
home was close to his workplace, it would not suffice for him to be on-call nearby. Anderson 
was required at the hotel because it was only by being present on the premises that he met the 
needs of his employer. Accordingly, attendance overnight was his “work”, for which he was 
entitled to contractual pay. 
In Rossiter v Burrow Down Support Services UKEAT/0592/07/LA; [2008] 6 WLUK 615, a 
night-sleeper was required to remain on-site at a residential home for security purposes. He 
was able to sleep for nine of the ten hours of his shift and paid a small flat rate that was 
topped up by extra pay when he was woken as required. The EAT, following British Nursing 
and Scottbridge, found that throughout his sleep-in shift, Mr Rossiter was “working” for the 
purposes of minimum wage protection since he was required to deal with anything untoward 
that might happen during the night and was therefore entitled to minimum wage rates even 
while he was permitted to sleep.  
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In South Manchester Abbeyfield Society v Hopkins UKEAT/0079/10/ZT; [2011] I.C.R. 254, 
the EAT considered the situation of a worker in a residential home who worked day-shifts as 
well as night-shifts, in which she was required to be on-call, on-site, and was permitted to 
sleep. The EAT distinguished her situation from the facts in British Nursing, in Scottbridge 
and in Burrow Down, finding it was material that Hopkins was in receipt of an attendance 
allowance for being on-call at night in addition to her wages for day-time work. In this 
situation, Hopkins was “on-call” rather than “working” during the sleep-in and the 
availability regulations applied. The case of Whittlestone v BJP Homesupport 
UKEAT/0128/13/BA; [2014] I.C.R. 275 concerned a sleep-in shift at the personal home of 
two adults with learning disabilities. Whittlestone was required to “be there” just in case her 
assistance was needed during the night (at [59]). Applying its earlier decisions in Anderson 
and in Burrow Down, the EAT found her sleep-ins were “work” for the purposes of minimum 
wage protection and that the availability regulations were irrelevant.  
Yet in Mencap, Underhill L.J. went so far as to suggest that in light of the Low Pay 
Commission’s recommendations it was “not open” to a Court to decide that a worker on a 
sleep-in shift was “working” (at [80]). Further affirming this position, he found that Burrow 
Down was wrongly decided because the facts concerned a “residential home” yet the EAT 
failed to consider those facts alongside the recommendations of the Low Pay Commission. 
As his Lordship noted, the implication was that the ten EAT cases subsequent to Burrow 
Down that drew on its reasoning in respect of “sleep-ins”, could be “simply put to one side” 
(at [84]). 
This position on sleep-in shifts in general was determinative of the Court’s treatment of the 
individual appeals before it. At first instance in Mencap, the ET had found Claire Tomlinson-
Blake was caring for two men needing 24-hour assistance, at a privately-owned property 
which was not a care home, that she was obliged to remain on-site, to “keep a listening ear 
out during the night in case her support is needed” and “intervene where necessary”. The ET 
noted her presence at the house enabled her employer “to comply with the legal obligation 
placed upon it, to provide an appropriate level of care for the service users”. Furthermore: 
 
“… the onus was constantly upon her to use her professional 
judgement and to use the detailed knowledge that she had of the needs 
of these residents to decide when she should intervene in order to 
meet their needs and when she should not in order to respect their 
6 
 
right to privacy and autonomy. That epitomises her role as a carer.” 
(as quoted in Focus Care Agency at [52]). 
 
Absent the first step question of “work”, Underhill L.J. did not regard the need for workers to 
maintain a “listening ear” as anything more than axiomatic, since it was merely “what they 
are there for” (at [94]). Accordingly, Underhill L.J. did not distinguish the situation of Claire 
Tomlinson-Blake from the Court of Appeal’s general definition of a sleep-in. No 
consideration was given to the issue of lone working, or to levels of responsibility for 
vulnerable adults, to the need of employers to meet legal obligations, to the start-times or 
duration of sleep-in shifts, or indeed to the substance of care work.  
 
If the question of “work” had been asked for Claire Tomlinson-Blake, adhering to the 
approach taken in British Nursing may have proven illuminating. Accordingly, deliberation 
over whether or not Tomlinson-Blake was “working” would transpose the sleep-in shift out 
of the home of her service-users and into a different location, close-by enough for her to be 
woken for the purposes of work as required (note the availability regulations apply where a 
worker “by arrangement sleeps at or near a place of work”). In so doing, it would become 
evident that Tomlinson-Blake could not have fulfilled the needs of her employer, nor could 
she have provided the care that was necessary and integral to her job, without being 
physically present in the same house as those for whom she had the care. As per British 
Nursing and Anderson, this suggests that Tomlinson-Blake was “working”.  
 
As regards its treatment of facts relating to John Shannon, the Court of Appeal in Mencap 
also found “availability for work” rather than “actual work”.  Shannon’s employer provided 
him with live-in accommodation at a care home and required his attendance as an on-call 
night-care assistant from 10pm – 7am.  Shannon was able to sleep during those hours but was 
expected to respond to any request for assistance. His representative, Mr Casper Glyn Q.C. 
submitted that the question of work called for recognition that the overnight presence of the 
worker was needed to meet the employers’ staffing obligations as per Regulation 18, Health 
and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014. However, overlooking 
Anderson, Underhill L.J. associated this point with the decisions post-Burrow Down and 
could “not see that it assists on the question of whether he was actually working or available 
for work” (at [99]). 
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The Mencap decision raises the potential that in social care, individual parties are permitted 
to reach agreements regarding sleep-in shifts in which workers effectively contract-out of 
statutory wage protection. Yet, it is clear from section 2(8) NMWA that the Secretary of State 
had no power by which to give special treatment to “different sectors of employment” or 
“persons of different occupations”. This suggests that the availability regulations ought not to 
be applied to residential care workers, in the absence of a question of “work”, simply because 
they are residential care workers. Notwithstanding this concern, an elasticity of the phrase 
“residential home” should not be assumed. Workers such as Tomlinson-Blake assist people 
with disabilities to live independently, in private homes, supporting them to make 
autonomous choices in their local communities and to decide for themselves over issues such 
as what time they go to bed at night or how they wish to spend their time. Working alone, in 
the absence of managerial oversight, a single worker will attend to the needs of multiple 
vulnerable adults and support them as individuals.  
The “expectation of sleep” and ability to be “woken” are key elements of the Court of 
Appeals’ definition of a “sleep-in”. These are phrases novel in the context of prior case law 
and missing from the relevant regulations. They are difficult to square with the organisation 
of contemporary social care, now largely delivered in community and domestic settings 
which are very different from the institutional, public sector services of decades past. It is 
interesting to consider if a worker in a private home may be “woken if required” where there 
is no agent of the employer to wake her or to decide upon the circumstance in which her 
response is required? Similarly, should a worker be reasonably understood as “expected to 
sleep” if she is “constantly exercising professional judgement” throughout a sleep-in (as per 
Tomlinson-Blake) and thus denied full minimum wage protection while also contractually 
bound to fulfil the statutory duties of her employer? It appears that the Court of Appeal’s 
novel definition of a sleep-in sits awkwardly with the facts of the appeals, with prior legal 
wording and with the contemporary organisation of social care. Consequently, its disposal of 
the first step question as to whether a worker is “working”, and its apparent endorsement of 
special treatment in social care, seem unlikely to withstand the test of time. At the time of 
writing, applications for leave to appeal are under consideration by the Supreme Court. 
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